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ABSTRACT 
Different types of legislative politics are explained in this paper by the distribution of 
legislators' demands. Demands are legislators' willingness to pay for victory on a bill, with votes on 
other issues, effort, or work. Different demand distributions require different institutions and 
"politics" for the legislators to obtain the results they want. 
The types of politics can be largely identified with Lowi 's typology of interest-group 
interaction. Distributive politics combines many individual projects, each with a small intensely 
favorable minority and a large, slightly opposed majority. Since no one project could pass on its 
own, compound bills are created that benefit all legislators (Weingast 1979). 
Redistributive issues have two large intensely opposed groups. Their politics are conflict, 
mobilizations of one's partisans, and efforts to obtain the votes of the few indifferents (Schneider 
1979). 
Regulative politics have two forms. Simple regulative issues have small intense groups for 
and against the bill, and a vast majority of indifferents. Each side appeals to the indifferents, 
creating a natural arena for vote-trading. Complex regulative issues allow the distribution of demand 
to change as the bill proposal is modified. They often involve novel legislation, whose consequences 
are not clear. Those dominating the agenda control the nature of the bill to maximize their gains and 
assure a majority for passage (Shepsle and Weingast 1984). Vote-trading also occurs, since most 
legislators are indifferent. 
Different Preferences, Different Politics: 
A Demand-and-Structure Explanation 
Theodore Lowi 's typology of issues and policies is widely agreed to distinguish different 
fonns of legislative politics, but his explanation for the categories has not been fully persuasive. 
This paper uses demand theory to analyze the different politics described by Lowi. Demand theory 
can illuminate many questions in legislative politics; it provides cardinal measures of valuation and 
methods of estimating those values statistically.1 Different distributions of political demand across 
legislators cause differences in legislative politics and institutional structure similar to those Lowi 
observed. Demand theory provides a more general theory of different types of politics and several 
testable differences from Lowi's typology. Evidence from case studies is analyzed and roll-call 
voting studies and the implications are compared with those ofLowi's theory. Finally, some 
improvements of the theory are discussed. 
1. Lowi's Typology
Lowi (1964) criticizes interest-group pluralism's claims that the major interests in society 
will be represented by interest groups, and through bargaining, these interests should come to a 
compromise. Reviewing Bauer, Pool and Dexter's (1963) study of the politics of foreign trade in the 
1950's, Lowi finds that 1) many interests were unrepresented, and 2) an explicit compromise among 
the parties was never negotiated. Lowi sketches an alternative to the pluralist model that accounts 
for these facts: legislators respond in different ways when groups put different kinds of pressures on 
Congress. With political actors maximizing their expected benefits (p. 688), this leads to three major 
categories of politics: distributive, regulative and redistributive. 
(1) (Distributive) In the short run certain kinds of government decisions can be made without 
regard to limited resources. Policies of this kind are called "distributive," a tenn first coined 
for nineteenth-century land policies, but easily extended to include most contemporary 
public land and resource policies; rivers and harbors ("pork barrel") programs; defense 
procurement and R & D; labor, business, and agricultural "clientele" services; and the
traditional tariff. Distributive policies ... can be ... disaggregated and dispensed unit by small 
unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. These 
are ... highly individualized decisions .. .in which the indulged and the deprived, the loser and 
the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation. Indeed, in many instances of 
distributive policy, the deprived cannot as a class be identified ... 
(2) Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable 
of the almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distinctive policies. Although the 
laws are stated in general tenns ("Arrange the transportation system artistically." "Thou 
shalt not show favoritism in pricing"), the impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of 
directly raising costs and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals 
("Get off the grass!" "Produce kosher if you advertise kosher!"). Regulatory policies are 
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distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a 
direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived. 
So, while implementation is firm-by-firm and case-by-case, policies cannot be disaggregated 
to the level of the individual or the single firm (as in distribution), because individual 
decisions must be made by application of a general rule and therefore become interrelated 
within the broader standards of law. Decisions cumulate among all individuals affected by 
the law in roughly the same way. Since the most stable lines of perceived common impact 
are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along 
sectoral lines ... 
(3) Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations among broad 
categories of private individuals are involved and, hence, individual decisions must be 
interrelated. But...the categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. 
They are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and 
proletariat. The fact that our income tax is in reality only mildly redistributive does not alter 
the stakes involved in income tax policies. The same goes for our various "welfare state" 
programs ... The nature of a redistributive issue is not determined by ... how redistributive a 
policy is going to be. Expectations about what it can be, what it threatens to be, are 
determinative. (Lowi, 1964, pp. 690-691). 
These politics can be placed in a demand framework, beginning with particular distributions 
of demand and adding institutions that work well for those demands. The theory then adds a "new 
institutionalist" claim that legislatures develop structures that help them maximize aggregate 
demand, or surplus, to the legislators. 
These different types of politics suggest elements of a theory of comparative legislative 
institutions. For the paper finds the most efficient institutional structure for each distribution of 
legislator preferences, and predicts that that structure will be chosen. 
(1) Distributive politics provide nearly pure private benefits, with "a large number of small, 
intensely organized interests" in "a politics of every man for himself." Private gains are possible, 
and the private interests try to obtain those gains, but costs are not considered: 
When a billion-dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items 
and each item can be dealt with without regard to the others, ... political relationships 
approximate ... "mutual noninterference" --a mutuality under which it is proper for each to 
seek duties (indulgences) for himself but improper and unfair to oppose duties 
(indulgences) sought by others. (1964 p. 693) 
This is like Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) "roads" case of intense demands for individual 
projects that are achieved by logrolling, with small widely spread losses that are ignored. Such 
distributive politics are modeled in Weingast (1979), Shepsle and Weingast (1981) and Weingast, 
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Shepsle and Johnsen (1981); they show why a universalism rule dominates a minimum winning 
coalition for these special-interest projects. They also show that a limit to distributive expenditures 
is desirable.2 but they cannot explain what that limit will be (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981, 
pp. 658-659). 3
(2) Regulative politics involves issues that are related to each other and that partly conflict: 
. . .  there is no way for regulatory policies to be disaggregated into a very large number of 
unrelated items. Because individual regulatory decisions involve direct confrontations of 
indulged and deprived, the typical political coalition is born of conflict and compromise 
among tangential interests that usually involve a total sector of the economy. (p. 695) 
It involves "a multiplicity of groups organized around tangential relations." Regulatory issues are 
usually not zero-sum since they usually result in creative compromise. The alternatives are related 
in a complex way, unlike distributive issues. As "the coalitions will shift as the interests change or 
as conflicts of interest emerge," regulative politics are less stable than distributive politics (p. 697). 
Lowi claims that Congressional committees find regulative issues hard to handle because of this 
instability, so the issues are transferred to independent agencies. 
(3) Redistributive issues are the least amenable to compromise: most people are involved on 
one side or the other, and conflict involves 'peak' organizations: those that represent business or 
labor as a whole. 
In redistribution there will never be more than two sides and the sides are clear, stable,
and consistent. Negotiation is possible, but only for the purpose of strengthening or 
softening the impact of redistribution. And there is probably one elite for each side. (p. 
699) 
Redistribution involves just one issue with two opposed sides, and approaches a zero-sum game. 
(Since compromise is mentioned, compromise may have mutual benefits.) And everyone favors one 
side or the other. 
Types of politics differ so greatly, Lowi (1970) says, because the nature of coercion varies, 
as shown in Table 1. 
Likelihood 
of Coercion: 
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Table 1 - Types of Coercion and Types of Policy 
Removed 
Immediate 
Coercion Works Through: 
Individual Environment 
Conduct of Conduct 
Distributive Constitutive 
Regulative Redistributive 
Coercion working through individual conduct vs. the environment of conduct implies private vs. 
public goods (Olson 1965). Likely vs. unlikely coercion suggests that in the former case some 
legislators lose, but in the latter none loses. That implies both benefits and cost in the former case,
but only benefits in the latter. Table 2 puts Lowi's categories in these terms.4 
Benefits only 
Benefits and Costs 
Table 2 - Types of Good and Types of Policy 
Distribution of Benefits and Costs: 
Private Public 
Distributive Constitutive 
Regulative Redistributive 
Lowi's (and Salisbury's) constitutive category is similar to Samuelsonian "pure public 
goods": everyone gains equally from such bills. They would not be controversial, and so would not 
appear in roll-call analysis or in controversial debate. However, in Weingast's theory, distributive 
bills are made by combining many distributive issues so that every legislator benefits. Thus, 
distributive issues combined into bills might be constitutive. 5 
Schneider (1979, p. 33) points out in critiquing Lowi that legislators' perception of bills 
determines their type, not the actual material gains and losses. Thus, if all bills were seen in the 
context of a great battle between that haves and have-nots, all bills would be redistributive. We 
follow Schneider in using the distribution of legislators' perceived benefits and costs. 
la. Committees and Agendas 
We now consider the most appropriate institutional structure for each type of issue. We 
concentrate on committee agenda control models. If committees write bills favoring their own 
preferences, the amount of floor amendment is a positive function of the difference in preferences
between the committee and the full membership. Uncontrolled committees will write bills to 
maximize their net surplus, subject to the constraint that the bill can pass the full legislature (Shepsle
and Weingast 1984).6 When the committee's preferred bill is very close to what will pass the 
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legislature, amendment costs should keep the number of changes low. But as the committee's 
preferred bill diverges from what will pass the full legislature, the committee will rationally accept 
an increased risk of amendment by proposing a bill further from what it knows will pass. 
The committee agenda-control theory (Shepsle and Weingast 1981, 1984 and Denzau and 
Mackay 1983) gives a committee just one tool: to design a bill that a majority of legislators prefer to 
the status quo. However, since leaders and legislators vote-trade across issues, committees have 
another tool. Party leaders can vote-trade to pass bills that provide a net positive benefit to the party 
members, when only a minority of legislators favor passage.7 (This occurs when proponents have 
more intense preferences about the bill than do opponents.) Similarly, leaders vote-trade to defeat 
bills with a net harm to the party members, despite a majority of votes in favor (Koford 1982). In 
vote-trading, legislators promise voting support in exchange for leaders' promises to pass or defeat 
bills. Leaders ' "persuasion" or appeals to party loyalty are equivalent to vote-trading, as they imply 
a quid pro quo. 
In some policy arenas, committees find that leadership "persuasion" and vote-trading are 
important; that implies modification of the pure committee agenda-control model. Also, committees 
actually control the agenda along with party leaders. In the House of Representatives, the Rules 
Committee determines agenda control, and completely closed rules are unusual. In the Senate, the
agenda is never closed (without unanimous consent). So to obtain a desirable agenda committees 
need support from the floor leadership and the members as a whole, which presumably comes only 
when the committee takes their preferences into account. 
For a distributive bill, there should be no costs to distributing the various benefits desired: 
no groups oppose passage of benefits for themselves. There is no immediate reason for the 
committee leader to oppose amendments if they are strongly desired, since resources are not strictly 
constrained. Nevertheless, since the overall budget is limited, not all amendments can be accepted. 
Substantial groups are opposed to regulative and redistributive bills. Intense opponents will 
try to amend such bills over the committee's objections, and should succeed sometimes. 
Lowi's data, shown in Table 3, support these assertions: distributive bills are amended, but 
never over the objections of the sponsor. Powerful hostile coalitions aren't evident on these bills. 
However, on redistributive and regulative bills, many amendments are proposed and a fair share are 
passed over the sponsor's objections. 
The agenda control model has several weaknesses. First, amendments are usually proposed 
when they might pass - roughly half of each category's amendments pass - so we do not know the 
intrinsic demand for amendments, but the equilibrium of demand for amendments by members and 
supply of acceptances by committee leaders and the floor. The cost of proposing amendments must 
be compared with the demand for, or value of, amendments. Second, committees err in perceiving 
the legislature 's preferences, and that difficulty of determining member preferences surely varies 
across policies: committees should err in determining preferences more on redistributive and 
regulative bills, so these bills will change more often. (Distributive bills are quite similar from year 
to year.)8 A theory of regulative issue demands that lets such questions be examined is developed in 
Section 2. 
While both theory and the Table 3 data imply that distributive politics largely occur in 
committee, this can occur in two ways. (1) All members interested in the issues are on the
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committee and all benefit from the decision. (2) Since all legislators are interested in the outcome 
and any committee would be biased to favor its members', the leadership chooses a representative 
committee under its control to distribute the gains fairly.9 
However, on regulative and redistributive issues, these distributions of preferences do not 
occur. Instead, redistributive politics has coherent voting blocs, while regulative issues have little 
coherence, suggesting that members vote on such bills according to individual or constituency tastes. 
(See Table 4, from Lowi 1964). Party or ideology preference is strongest for redistributive issues, 
but it seems very weak on regulative issues.10 With these distributions of preferences, it is hard to 
establish committees that would benefit the legislators as a whole. 
This section has outlined a theory to explain different types of policy, based on the 
distribution of benefits and costs on issue and on institutional structure. The next section develops 
the theory in detail. 
2. A Demand Model:
Public/Private and Separable/Non-Separable Goods 
To legislators, bills provide benefits and costs similar to economic goods and bads. Bills are 
largely public, not private, goods. Bills and issues can diverge from a private good in two important 
ways: the public vs. private dimension, how similarly members are affected by a bill; and 
separability, the extent to which one issue is linked to other issues.11
The first principle is shown in Figure 1. Legislators have a demand for passage or defeat of 
each bill. Indexing the legislators by i = l ,. . .,I, each legislator 's demand is D;. D; can be positive or 
negative, as shown in Figure 1; negative D; show a demand for defeat of the bill. The Di are 
cardinal measures of intensity of demand; they represent how much a legislator would be willing to 
use his limited resources of time, energy and political power to achieve the desired result. That is, 
the cardinal measure shows lww much of a good or bad the bill is to each legislator. These cardinal 
numbers could also be interpreted as the gains and losses of political support in Fiorina (1974) for 
single-minded seekers of re-election. Or they may indicate the distance of a policy from the 
legislator's preferred policy. Two members might/eel equally strongly about a bill, but one with 
greater resources would have greater demand. (Legislator demand is described at greater length in 
Koford 1982) The D; can thus be compared across legislators.12 
Figure 1 lines up the legislators in declining order of D;, creating a demand curve. The area 
under the demand curve but above the zero axis, is the legislator surplus from passage, Sp. The area
below the zero axis but above the demand curve is the legislator surplus from defeat of the bill, Sv. 
If Sp > Sd, the legislators as a whole gain from passage, while if Sp < Sd, they gain as a whole from
the bill's defeat. Following Fenno (1973), Weingast (1979), Koford (1987), Shepsle and Weingast 
(1984), a legislature is thought to develop institutions that help the members get what they want. 
Thus there is a presumption that the legislature will pass bills with Sp > Sd and defeat bills with
Sd >SP. We now look at the nature of the issues underlying each type of politics; how the issues are
aggregated into bills is considered later in the analysis of structure. 
Distributive issues are separable: they are not connected by a production function or by 
legislator tastes to any other issue. A few legislators gain greatly from the passage of a bill on a 
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given issue; the remaining legislators are essentially indifferent, as shown in Figure la. 
Redistributive issues are also separable from other issues. However, most legislators have 
high demands, with a considerable number of legislators on each side. This situation is shown in 
Figure l b. 
Regulative issues are more complex. Only a minority of legislators typically are interested; 
most are indifferent. And there are two opposing sides: one side gains, and one loses by a bill on 
the issue, as shown in Figure le. However, regulatory issues are generally non-separable: several 
issues are related, with trade-offs possible across the issues.13 For example, rules regulating overall 
railroad profits necessarily affect special rules affecting coal shipments, and other special rules 
affecting shipments of coal for export. Often, the several sides redefine the issues, considering 
several facets of the bill, or bringing up new facets, until an arrangement is worked out that benefits 
most interests. Usually the "compromise" gives each side an advantage on the specific issues it cares 
about most. 
Thus, several issues must be modeled in regulative politics. This is done for two issues with 
the three dimensions shown in Figure 2. The horizontal axes represent two related issues, X 1 and 
X 2• The vertical axis shows the height of demand, Dj, at each point. (j indexes different bills, J = 
l ,..,j,..,J). Each X; dimension shows amounts of a particular good. X 1 might represent the range of 
prices within which railroads had freedom to choose (a major concern of the Staggers Act of 1980). 
X2 could be restraints on railroads with monopoly power (largely relevant to coal shippers). For 
eachX 1, X2 combination there is a distribution of preferences like that shown in Figure le. The 
height of demand, Dj =SP -Sd, is the net demand at a particular point in X 1;x2 sxace. It
emphasizes the goal of finding a bill that satisfies legislators as fully as possible.1 
The underlying distribution of demand can be found for each X 1;x2 combination. It is the 
task of legislative leaders (and legislative entrepreneurs) to estimate the demand distribution for 
X 1.X 2 points that the legislature has not considered. A leader might consider the effect of increasing 
the amount of X 1 from X 1;x2 (in Figure 2), which we may call point A0• Five possible alternatives 
are A 1, A 2, A 3, A 4, A 5. The hypothetical distributions are shown in Figure 3, where Dj in Figure 2 is
consistent with the distributions in Figure 3. A leader concerned solely with passing the bill would 
choose A 3; a leader concerned with maximizing gains to the winning groups would choose A 2. (The
distributions are drawn so that Sp2 is the largest Spj and D3 is the largest Dj for these alternatives.)
Leaders and entrepreneurs must also consider whether there are other dimensions, 
X 3, X 4 , ... Xn, that are relevant. The leader and the relevant subcommittee must be expert in finding
dimensions and particular points in the multidimensional space for which Dj > 0. This is the more
complex fonn of "regulative politics." 
2a. Issues, Bills, and Structure 
We now examine how bills can be most efficiently developed for each issue type, given 
three elements of legislative structure. 
(1) Majority rule. For a bill to pass, a majority of the legislators must vote for it. 
(2) Transactions costs. Explicit vote-trades are costly to arrange and enforce. Implicit vote 
trades (logrolling), that combine several issues in one bill, are least costly when done in a small 
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group (subcommittee, committee), on issues with demands that are independent. As more legislators 
are concerned and as issues become more interrelated, transactions costs rise. 
(3) Organization. Leaders organize and represent interests. Each demand group is 
represented by an organized interest, which can be a party and its elected leader, a self-selected 
leader (entrepreneur), a committee head, or an external interest group (Strom and Rundquist 1978). 
(Since organization is costly, some demands do not get represented and so are not observed (Lowi 
1964.)) 
The legislature is assumed to adopt a structure that serves its goals. Demands do not cycle, 
although there can be cycles in majority preferences.15 Thus a structure must be found that 
constrains voting cycles and assures that legislative leaders and entrepreneurs find the highest­
demand bills and pass them with the lowest possible transaction costs. That may be done as follows: 
a. Distributive issues. Since no simple distributive issue can pass independently, many of
them must be combined. These issues continually recur across all districts so an efficient long-term 
solution is the rule of universalism, allowing each legislator equal distributive benefits (Weingast 
1979, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). (For most distributive issues, not all legislators 
actually benefit at once: not all districts have new water or military construction projects. But all 
legislators can expect to have such projects sometime. The committee should assure that high 
demand projects are chosen, and that these are spread widely across districts.) To minimize 
transaction costs, a specialized committee determines the optimal package. The legislature as a 
whole must set a limit to total resources for distributive bills, since proponents of individual projects 
would favor excessive spending. Presumably, it decides the amount of resources that maximizes net 
political benefits (demand), which means approving projects with net political benefits; in terms of 
Figure la, all projects with SP > Sd. (No model yet describes the institutions that would assure an
optimal outcome for these choices.) 16 
Figure 4 shows three distributive bills, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3, with total spending increasing from Y 1 to
Y 3, so that Y 2 adds some projects to Yi. and Y 3 adds some projects to Y 2• As in Figure 3, demand,
or D; , of each member for the three bills is shown in declining order from left to right. The bills are 
constitutive, as everyone gains from passage. The only question is which should pass, and the best 
rule is the bill with the highest total Di , Y 2• (While Y 3 has the greatest amount of spending, it has
lower total demand than Y 2, indicating that the additional projects have political costs greater than
their benefits. Also note that Y 3 provides a more equal distribution of benefits to the legislators than 
Y 2; but total net demand is less.)
b. Regulative Issues. ·If all of those interested in a particular issue can be represented on a
committee, the legislature can let the committee write the optimal bill. If a committee majority tries 
to pass a less desirable bill, the victimized minority should be able to point out the possibility of a 
more desirable bill. When a committee represents other members, as with the agriculture committee, 
bargaining between the committee representatives of these interests and the other interested 
legislators should occur. Bill passage involves persuading the many indifferents to vote for the bill, 
often by vote-trading or appeals to "party loyalty". These appeals should fail if a higher benefit bill 
is available, but was not proposed. 
When most legislators are interested in a regulative issue, a committee that will represent the 
full membership is needed. (No simple rule to "distribute" benefits is known). A reasonable 
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solution is a committee controlled (or limited) by the party leadership. In the House of
Representatives Ways and Means, Appropriations (prior to the 1970s), Rules, and Budget have acted 
in this manner. The Congress' geographic distribution rules for committee seats also may help 
assure a representative committee. When no single committee exists, as with energy issues, or 
fonnerly with budget issues, transactions costs can easily be too high to adopt any bill. 
c. Redistributive issues. In their simplest fonn, these are all- or-nothing issues that everyone
cares strongly about, with similar numbers on each side. In recent decades, several issues have fit
this pattern: civil rights, the Vietnam war, labor unions, abortion, and school prayer. The largest 
redistributive issue, the economic role of government, does not fit so well, as bills on this question 
can be modified in many ways. And while most legislators are highly interested in this issue, the 
ideological extremes are much more concerned about it than those near the center, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
In theory, p.ure redistributive issues are handled simply: they are brought to the floor and
voted up or down. 7 Mixed redistributive issues must generally be modified numerous times to
assure that they have a high chance of passage, making them partly regulative in this respect. With 
all legislators concerned with the bill, changes tend to be complicated and controversial. 
Negotiations must bring in representatives of all major legislative groups, and are are generally 
controlled by the main legislative leaders or by the executive. Unlike regulative issues, there are not 
enough indifferents to make extensive vote-trading worthwhile. 
3. Empirical Evidence
This section first applies the demand/structure approach, and than contrasts its classification 
with Lowi 's. Two contrasts are that an issues's classification can change over time, e.g., regulative 
to redistributive, and left-right "ideological" conflicts are categorized as redistributive, regardless of 
the specific point at issue. Finally, I suggest a way of statistically estimating the relevant demands. 
The 17 cases in Lowi (1972) are given in Table 5, where they are divided into distributive, 
regulative, and redistributive politics. For each bill, we must visualize the distribution of demand 
intensity across legislators. The four distributive cases all combine many issues that benefit 
particular interests and hann no one except consumers (the tariff) and the taxpayers. The six 
regulative cases have two definite sides, and the FDA, Rent Control and Robinson-Patman bills are 
evidently complex battles between small special interests. But the AAA bill seems distributive, 
benefitting fanners at the expense of the (indifferent) public. The two labor bills seem to have 
involved most legislators intensely on one side or the other and so been redistributive; any regulative 
element comes from non-separability: there was intense bargaining to detennine what specific 
restrictions on labor unions would hurt pro-unionists least and satisfy anti-unionists most. 
Considering the ideological fire in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffen battles, it is surprising that 
Lowi does not see them as ideological and resdistributive. (Lowi classifies bills involving regulation 
as regulative, but they are often redistributive in a demand sense. That is a major difference in the 
two classifications.) Finally, the redistributive issues all involve ideology. The two fann issues 
would be distributive if only fanners' interests were considered. But as Schneider argues, the issue 
is what the participants think it is. And fann bills were then seen in large part as a referendum on the 
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role of government in the economy. 
The first four columns of Table 5 identify pressure groups outside Congress, and the last 
three identify how Congress handled each bill. (The role of outside lobby groups varied within each 
case, suggesting that the outside lobby groups did not determine the nature of the issue. Perhaps they 
enforce the "public goods" element in bills, keeping legislators from shirking (Olson 1965.)) 
Committees were most decisive for distributive bills, and in no case was the bill altered significantly 
on the floor--the demand model implies. Regulative bills were determined both on the floor and in 
committee. Redistributive bills were determined at the floor level or by the executive, as our 
structural theory implies. 
Distributive bills are consistent with the model. They are passed in committee by logrolling, 
and are not defeated or amended on the floor, so no powerful blocs oppose them. On these bills the 
committee itself did not include all of the interested parties: the committee either dealt with other 
groups, or the leadership controlled the committee in order to assure that interested parties were 
properly taken care of (Fenno 1966). The 1970s rules and attitude changes imply less organization, 
so that small groups have more power (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1981). But for a distributive bill to 
pass it must benefit virtually all members. So Weingast's (1979) model seems accurate.18 
Regulative bills are amended both in committee and on the floor, in a process of 'bargaining' 
according to Lowi. Bargaining implies negotiations with several sides. So on these bills there are 
two (or more) sides who have something to gain from negotiation. They are not all represented in 
the committees in proportion to floor strength; otherwise, floor amendments would fail. These many 
amendments on the floor are contrary to the agenda control model (Shepsle and Weingast 1984), 
where the committee chooses a bill that will win. So the agenda control model as currently 
structured does not explain regulative politics. Finally, the Landrum-Griffen labor bill, which Lowi 
considers regulative but I classify redistributive, was largely decided on the floor, as a redistributive 
bill should be. 
Redistributive bills can be proposed by committees controlled by particular interests, but 
evidently the pressure for passage comes from the floor or the President. Floor outcomes vary: on 
three bills there was contention, as the model implies; one (Employment Act of '46) had some 
compromise, and one was passed without much disagreement. However, on the Farm Security 
Administration, Farmers Home Administration, and Social Security Acts, the executive played the 
major role. A theory of executive power is needed to explain these bills. 
Several other authors have issues that we can classify. Mayhew (1966) studied farm, urban, 
labor, and western issues. They can be categorized as 
Lowi Demand Intensity 
Distributive: Western, Urban Western, Farm, Urban 
Regulative: Labor, Farm 
Redistributive: Labor 
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This example shows how demand can be found without detailed data on legislators' 
preferences. Demand intensity was estimated as follows: Western, Farm and Urban issues all 
involved a large benefit to a minority of the legislators; other legislators lose only by the required 
taxes, although some Republicans ideologically opposed government intervention in farming. Labor 
issues involved the whole country: the heavily unionized parts of the country largely favored strong 
labor laws (with few intense anti-union exceptions), and the less-unionized parts of the country 
strongly opposed these laws. Lowi's categories come from the nature of the bill: western and urban 
bills spend money on many small local projects; labor and farm bills regulate major sectors of the 
economy. 
Mayhew provides evidence to evaluate these categories. He finds that farm and western bills 
passed easily, with the decisions being made in the Agriculture and Interior committees. Urban bills 
were moderately successful, and were logrolled with farm and western bills to pass. They appear to 
be handled as distributive issues. Labor bills were the most controversial and ideological, and the 
least successful (p. 167). Compromise did not occur, and issues went to the floor and were settled on 
a contentious fashion. Thus, labor issues were redistributive.19 
Fenno (1973) examines variation in politics across six committees. Interior in the 1960's 
was distributive (p. 5), with western representatives extremely concerned and others uninterested. 
The committee should therefore pass bills that maximized benefits to westerners subject to 
successful passage. The committee was highly successful, being defeated on only three bills in 1957
- 1966 (pp. 259-261). This outcome is consistent with both models.20 
Post Office and Foreign Affairs were distributive committees then. The postal unions 
influenced a number of congressmen and faced weak opposition from the majority. A few 
congressmen were highly supportive of foreign aid, while most were indifferent or mildly opposed. 
In both cases, the committees reported bills that were cut down on the floor; but that was expected 
and was considered "play-acting " for the public. Sponsors could show that they tried to pass large 
appropriations, while opponents could show that they "cut the bill down to size." Thus these 
amendments do not imply committee failure. 
Education and Labor, in Fenno (1973), did not compromise, but acted in a redistributive 
manner. Its bills caused ideological battles on the floor and the bills usually failed. 
Finally, Appropriations and Ways and Means handled questions of broad interest. In this era 
they tried to represent the dominant will and generally succeeded. Appropriations bills are largely 
bundles of distributive issues, and most amendments add or subtract programs that are of special 
interest to a few members. Most of the tax and tariff issues of Ways and Means were distributive. 
Tax bills can allow a large number of special-interest loopholes, which are individually distributive. 
And the final bills seem to be "fair " combinations of benefits to many individual interests and so also 
basically distributive. Fenno found these committees engaging in much internal logrolling and then 
passing their bills largely intact, in a distributive politics manner. However, tax policy has become 
strongly redistributive in the 1980's, involving the ideological issue of the size and role of 
government. This points out the contrast between the Lowi and demand approaches. When demand 
intensities change, we redefine the issue as redistributive, contrary to Lowi 's approach. 
Two recent studies of regulation classified politics in Lowi 's framework. Kingdon (1984) 
found that transportation and health issues were continually redefined in the hope of developing a 
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politically viable compromise. The issues were clearly regulative: small groups pro and con, and 
most people indifferent. However, national health insurance was an anomaly for Lowi's framework: 
it is "regulation" but clearly had redistributive demands: the rich vs. the working class. Nadel 
(1983, p. 241), in examining recent "economic regulation" bills, points out that their "most common" 
politics is really "client politics," which we categorize as distributive. But most social regulation 
appeared to be redistributive and ideological. Thus, "regulation" often has actually distributive or 
redistributive politics. 
This examination shows how the demand framework can categorize issues in committee and 
on the floor. As demand distributions and intensities change, the model indicates the change in 
politics, in contrast to Lowi's categorization. Thus, environmentalists drastically changed Interior's 
concerns and politics although the bills were still about dams. And the growth of ideological 
opposition to big government led to a strong redistributive element in budget and tax decisions in the 
1980s (Ellwood 1983, 1985). In fact, Schick (1983) explains that budgetary politics have changed 
from distributive to redistributive as legislators' views of the issue changed. A consensus to divide 
up benefits evenly was replaced with a struggle over the purpose of government. Thus, Schick 
implicitly uses our demand categories. Similarly, Sinclair (1985) finds that particular issues change 
to and from ideological/redistributive with the oil crises, while urban spending went in the opposite 
direction in the 1960's as it became a consensus policy. Issues do not remain in a particular 
category; when demand distributions change, so do the relevant politics. 
Some authors (Schneider 1979, 1984, Poole, 1981) claim that politics has one left-right 
dimension that determines most roll-call voting. Their claim is made most strongly for economic 
redistribution, while social issues and civil liberties might be redistributive on cleavages diverging 
from the economic dimension. Regulative bills should diverge strongly from the left-right 
dimension. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) report such results: 
The liberal-conservative dimension generally does poorly on those pork barrel, regional, and 
special interest issues that will always lie outside of any low-dimensional spatial model. 
These include tabocco subsides, solar power in California, the Tombigbee waterway, pay for 
members of Congress and the federal Civil Service, Amtrak service, D.C. airports, Mt. St. 
Helens relief, etc. (p. 373) 
Demand distributions can be estimated statistically from roll-call studies and categorized, 
providing a formal check on the informal analysis. Roll-call studies that give legislators' locations 
on a dimension can give demand distributions, with two assumptions. If we assume identical 
quadratic loss functions and equal power for all legislators, the locations imply demands. (Quadratic 
loss with distance is used in Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Ladha (1984).) Thus, a view of 
Congress' aggregate demand distribution follows directly from Poole and Rosenthal's (1985b, Table 
6, 1979) locational estimates; it is shown in Figure 6. The demands are for a small change to the 
"left" from a status quo point at the median legislator.21 This measure of aggregate roll-call 
demands gives a distribution that appears closest to the regulative distribution. It would be possible 
to test whether different "types" of bills have the distributions the theory proposes. 
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4. Extensions of the Theory
The evidence is not fully consistent with the demand model. The distribution of preferences 
and the separability of bills are hard to determine. Thus, improvement of the theory is desirable. 
Laws are fashioned by a process of innovation, with much uncertainty, search, and 
bargaining. The model could include leaders' probability estimates of legislators' demands. 
Subcommittee and committee leaders might have less information, and thus wider probability 
estimates about overall preferences than the floor leader, but better information about the nature of 
the bill (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987). 
Two "arenas of power" could be modeled: a committee with intense advocates, which 
structures and proposes bills, and a legislature which amends and disposes. For committees, 
ultimate control maybe determined by party leaders; they often control committee membership and 
can affect the success of bills. Similarly, leadership decisons and hence aggregate demands of each 
party are important at the floor level; committees cannot just "count noses" on the floor. 
Passive floor behavior has been assumed so that there is only one active "agent," the 
committee majority. That could occur if floor leaders defeat bills with Dj < 0, or favor the "known"
alternative with highest D j. Thus, floor leaders can be assumed fairly ignorant of specific bills:
while the committee knows demands exactly, leaders reject bills only if the benefits to a proposed 
bill are a finite amount less than the best possible bill.22 
In any case, the demand intensity approach has advantages in modeling politics within a
complex structure. Its categories are natural economic categories: the distribution of demand and 
the ratio of losers to gainers; gains from change in the characteristics of the bill and gains from 
trade-offs among similar bills. And the demand typology fits the data as well as does Lowi's 
typology. 
The demand typology also implies differences in the ability of exchange models (Coleman 
1966, Haefele 1971, Koford 1982) to explain legislatures. In those models, legislators obtain
generalized power by trading, and that gives them the demand for bills. Aggregate demand 
determines which bills pass and which fail. Exchange models have previously assumed that trading 
occurs on every bill. But this demand analysis suggests a more limited role for exchange. 
It appears that 
1) Distributive bills fit the exchange model best as they provide private benefits and there
are no collective opposed interests to consider. 
2) Regulative bills also fit fairly well, particularly the careful bargaining to maximize
aggregate benefits. (However, the uncertainty of innovation is described poorly by any static 
model.) 
3) Redistributive bills fit the exchange model poorly. These bills do not provide much
variation in intensity of preferences; exchange is thus very costly, which suggests that conflict 
replaces exchange. 
Several final questions may be asked. How much is the form of politics affected by the 
desire to impress constituents or lobbyists (Denzau, Riker and Shepsle 1985), as opposed to passing 
or defeating bills? The assumption has been that the legislator's only goal is to legislate, but 
legislators may want to produce dramatic political theater. 
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What legislative structure is really most efficient for its demand distribution? We need an 
analysis that evaluates all institutional structures to come to any positive conclusions. 
Finally, the influence of the executive and of lobbyists should be modeled explicitly. They 
are important actors (e.g. in Lowi's cases) but are in the model only as they influence the distribution 
of preferences. 23 
Distributive 
Bills, N=22 
Redistri bu ti ve 
Bills, N=25 
Regulative 
Bills, N=15 
Table 3 
Variation in Congressional Floor 
Amendments Across Issues 
(1) (2) 
Average Number of Percent 
Amendments of Amendments 
Proposed per Bill Passed 
5.8 41.8 
9.1 62.4 
12.8 48.9 
Includes all bills, 87th Congress, 1st Session, plus 13 major bills.
Source: Lowi (1970), Table 3 
Table 4 
Legislator Consistency Across Issue Types 
8 lst-88th Congress 
(3) 
Percent Significant 
Amendments Passed 
over Objections 
of Sponsoring 
Committee 
0 
24 
67 
Average Rank-Order Correlations (Q) Across Vote Categories 
Regulative Redistributive 
Republicans .13 .39 
Democrats .09 .41 
Source: Lowi (1970) 
Table 5 
Low I's Strnmary of Case Studies 
Primary Relationships Stab I I lty 
Units Among Among Lobby Role Committee Role Floor Role Executive Role 
Distributive 
Rivers-Harbors '50 single Jogrol I Ing highest very high detenn I nat Ive consensual suppl lcatlve 
Airports Aid '56-'59 single Jogrol Jing very high high determinative consensual suppl lcatlve 
ARA single Jogrol Jing highest high creative consensual suppl lcatlve 
T¥Jff, '50's single logrol Jing highest low creative contentious suppl Jcatlve 
Regul atlve 
FDA, '36 tr• assn. bargaining high low creative very creative suppl lcatlve 
Rent Control '50 tr. assn. bargaining low low creative creative suppl lcatlve 
Rob I nson-f'atman tr. assn. bargaining low very high creative not asc. passive 
AAA '36 tr. assn. bargaining low very high creative creative coordinative 
Taft-Hartley tr• assn. bargaining moderate
1 
passive !stalemated) 
Lan drum-Q-1 ff I n tr. assn. bargaining low high conduit very creat I ve coordinative & 
Redistributive suppl lcatlve 
Far-11 Security Administration !Bu. only> ldeol. high very high none none leglslatlve 
Farmers Home Administration <Bu· only> ldeol· very high high lobbyist not ascerta I ned legislative 
Social Security '35 Peaks ldeol. very high 111>derate conduit consensual leglslat�ve 
Federal Aid to Education Peaks ldeoJ. very high high lobby I st contentious Inactive 
Employment Act '46 Peaks ldeol. very high 111>derate very low very creative legislative 
Excess Profits 2 ldeol· very high moderate lobbyist contentious suppl lcatlve 
lnterna I Revenue '54 4 
!exemption & rates> Peaks ldeol• high moderate I cw-creative contentious legislative 
Lobby role: Very high If pr0111lnent 1111d crBDtlve In legislature, executive, and grass roots; high If prominent and creative at any point; moderate If only prominent; and low If no 
evidence of anything. 
Committee role: Conduit, lobbyist, creative, detennlnatlve, In that rough order of Importance. 
Floor role: consensual, contentious !If a Jot of debate but llttle alteration of the bll I), creative <If evidence of alteratlon). 
Executive role: passive, coordinative, suppllcatlve, legislative In that order. 
I Pro's high, antl's low· 
2 No mention Is made of any groups or associations. lhe "business cQlllllUnlty" Is termed "unanim ous" and "concerted" but not managed. 
3 Fa! Jed of passage. As a general rule, If executive activity Is low on a redistributive activity, the bll I Is probably doomed. lhls Is not true of the other tio:> types. 
4 Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation very creatlve--especlally Its staff; but It Is not a legislative COllllllttee. lhe Ways and '9ans Conlnolttee and Finance Committee were much 
Jess creative, much more ratifiers of accords reached bet-.i JCIRT and Treasury lawyers. 
Source: Lowl 11972> Table 2. 
Table 6 
Amendments to Appropriations Bills 
Amendments Proposed Amendments Passed 
Department Number Increase Decrease Number Increase Decrease 
Public Works 159 143 16 23 22 1 
Interior 96 61 35 40 22 18 
Agriculture 73 37 36 25 17 8 
State 53 6 47 10 0 10 
H.E.W. 52 32 20 19 11 8 
Labor 36 20 16 13 3 10 
Commerce 30 25 5 10 8 2 
Treasury 20 6 14 15 4 11 
Justice 8 3 5 3 1 2 
Other 20 7 13 5 3 2 
TOTAL 547 340 207 163 91 72 
NOTE: Amendments that covered several departments at once and could not be allocated to one 
department were left in the residual category "Other."
Source: Fenno (1966, p. 458) and Ferejohn (1974, p. 99). 
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Footnotes 
*Randy Calvert, Keith Krehbiel, Jerry Schneider, John Wright and an unknown referee gave helpful
comments. An earlier version was presented at the 1985 meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association. 
1. Legislative examples include the demand for regulation (Stigler 1971, Weingast and Moran
1983), demand for votes (Fiorina 1974), the demand for roll-call votes by constituencies and
PACs (Kau, Keenen, and Rubin 1982, Kalt and Zupan 1984.)
2. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) suggest that the explanation of limits upon distributive
expenditure lies in a committee (Appropriations or Budget) that acts as an agent for the
legislature in maintaining the desired level of spending. But the authorizing committees are, in
their model, also acting as agents of the legislature, so their model is incomplete. If the
committees are all agents of the legislature as a whole, it is not clear why the Budget and
Appropriations committees would need to restrain the authorizing committees.
3. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1982, pp. 660-662) allow for external effects but it is not clear 
that their essentially distributive model describes well issues in which external effects are 
crucial. 
4. Wilson (1974) proposes a similar theory of distribution of benefits and costs to explain
regulatory politics.
5. If legislators disagree on the size of government, distributive issues become partly 
redistributive: everyone would want the bills to pass, but some would want the overall size to 
be smaller and so might vote nay. 
6. Niskanen (1971) also makes this assumption. 
7. See Koford (1982), and Hayes (1981), which develops a theory in which the "distribution of 
benefits and costs " detennines the nature of political activity, an approach complementary to 
that taken here. 
8. Cook (1985) finds that committees are much better at anticipating their workload on
authorization (i.e., distributive) bills than on other matters.
9. Fenno (1973). However in Shepsle (1978), legislators seem able to choose their committees,
and so would not necessarily favor the general interest. Perhaps the regional and partisan
quotas on who can join committees force preferences close to the general interest. Leaders may
choose people who favor the general interest for the elite committees, but that is not indicated
by Shepsle' s data.
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10. This result appears to contradict the claim that voting in Congress is largely on a single 
ideological dimension (Schneider 1979, 1987, Poole 1981). Their tests for differences in 
ideological coherence across issue areas were on different dimensions than those explored here,
however. Only agriculture, which seems mostly regulative, fits one of our categories and for it
ideological voting seems least important. 
11. Uslaner (forthcoming) emphasizes that the interrelatedness of different parts of energy policy
turns its politics into a complex, confusing mess. Everything depends on everything else,
leading to a breakdown in the traditional committee-specialist method of writing and passing
bills.
12. By combining actual valuation and willingness to act, I neglect the public goods problem 
(Olson 1965): Why don't these legislators shirk? Empirically, legislators do not seem to shirk 
much; if they value a bill highly and some effort is needed to pass it, they exert that effort. And 
there are good theoretical reasons for legislators not to shirk. First, their true valuations are not 
a secret: their constituencies and campaign promises, and their personal preferences, are
known. Second, party leaders and outside lobbying groups can impose selective incentives
upon legislators to assume that they act in accord with their demand (K.oford 1987, Weingast
and Marshall 1984).
13. The theory of regulation, e.g. Peltzman (1976), emphasizes this multiplicity of interests and the 
possibility of tradeoffs among them.
14. Koford (1986) examines rules for aggregating legislator preferences. Both numbers and 
intensity matter, and can be weighted in many ways. The simplest rule, in which demands are 
summed (as in economics), is  used here. 
15. These demands are, of course, partial-equilibrium demands, meaning any one bill is "small" 
compared to the aggregate of all bills.
16. For some efforts to analyze aggregate constraints on committee decisions, see Ferejohn and 
Krehbiel (1985).
17. Sometimes legislators could prevent a bill from reaching the floor or being voted on by
disruptive tactics or filibusters.
18. If the Weingast (1979) model is applied strictly to norms of universalism, we would expect bills
to pass even if they did not benefit most or all members, so long as all members benefitted from
the passage of all distributive bills. 
17 
19. Fenno (1973) found similar ideological posturing on labor issues, and Schneider (1979) found
labor issues considered very ideological by members of Congress.
20. This high success rate contrasts with the much lower success of the Interior Subcommittee of
Appropriations (Ferejohn 1974; see Table 6) -- which had the most amended set of
appropriations bills ( 40, of which 22 were increases and 18 were decreases.) The subcommittee
members were chosen from outside the relevant interest group, so amendments increasing
spending might be expected, but it is hard to explain the decreases.
21. The positions are first adjusted for their distance from the central point, -.044; the distances are
then squared. A linear loss function would emphasize the extreme demands less, but the
distribution would still not look redistributive.
22. See Smith and Deering (1984, Chapter 8), and Sinclair (1983) for discussions of committee­
floor leader relations supporting this view.
23. Huitt (1969) shows the beginning of this "outsider "  role that now appears to dominate Congress
(Fiorina 1977).
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